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"OVERRULING" OPINIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Albert P. Blaustein* and Andrew H. Field** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
DESPIT:m its vaunted reputation for rectitude, the United States Supreme Court has been the first to deny its own 
judicial infallibility. For in at least ninety decisions, dating 
as far back as 1810 and as recent as its 1956 Term, the Supreme 
Court has made public confession of error by overruling its 
previous determinations. 
This is a study of those ninety decisions-a statistical account-
ing of overruling cases and cases overruled, and a listing of the 
judges who agreed and disagreed with what was said and done. 
And this is a study of the "right to be wrong" -an inquiry into 
when and under what circumstances the Supreme Court should 
overrule its prior dictates. 
This is also an introduction to ninety studies which should be 
made on each of these ninety overrulings. For each of these "dras-
tic" decisions warrants individual inquiry and analysis. The Su-
preme Court is a courageous court. Only a courageous court 
would have faced the reactions of the times to Marbury v. Madi-
son,1 Dred Scott v. Sanford,2 Schecter Corp. v. United States,8 and 
Brown v. Board of Education.4 Yet even a courageous tribunal-
especially one so adept at distinguishing and qualifying prior 
judicial pronouncements-is loath to admit judicial error. Has 
it really been necessary for the Supreme Court to take this drastic 
step on ninety separate occasions? And if not really necessary, can 
such decisions be justified? 
• Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, South Jersey Division.-Ed. 
••Rutgers, '58 Law.-Ed. 
11 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). 
2 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857). 
3 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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There is no magic in the number "ninety." The broad state-
ment that the Supreme Court has overruled itself on ninety 
separate occasions is, like all broad statements, subject to qualifi-
cations. But the figure of ninety has not been lightly chosen. It 
represents a total of three categories of Supreme Court over-
r{!lings, selected on the basis of three definite criteria. 
Here are (1) cases in which the Supreme Court has expressly 
stated that it was overruling a prior decision; or (2) cases which 
Justice Brandeis or Justice Douglas have cited as further ex-
amples of overrulings; or (3) other cases which the authors be-
lieve to be obvious instances in which the Supreme Court has 
overruled itself. Scant note has been made of those decisions 
which have become legal nullities through being qualified or 
distinguished. 
In seventy of the ninety cases, the nine men made definite 
statements that they were overruling prior determinations. Such 
statements take many forms. The most clear-cut of these pro-
nouncements appear (chronologically) in such cases as County 
of Cass v. Johnston, Motion Picture Patents Company v. Uni-
versal Film Manufacturing Co., Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, Smith v. Allwright and Girouard 
v. United States. 
In the 1877 Cass County case, for example, the Supreme 
Court had this to say: "It follows that our decision in Harshman 
v. Bates County,5 in so far as it declares the law to be uncon-
stitutional, must be overruled."6 The overruling statement in the 
1917 Motion Picture Patents case ran this way: "It is obvious 
that the conclusions arrived at in this opinion are such that the 
decision in Henry v. Dick Co.7 must be regarded as overruled."8 
The 1932 Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. Co. case contained this 
statement: "Both [prior9] cases are out of harmony with the 
general current of the decisions of this court . . . and they are 
now definitely overruled."10 Smith v. Allwright in 1944 ended 
IS 92 U.S. 569 (1875). 
6 95 U.S. 360 at 369 (1877). 
7 224 U.S. 1 (1912). 
8243 U.S. 502 at 518 (1917). 
9 Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920), and Erie R. Co. v. Szary, 253 U.S. 86 (1920). 
10 284 U.S. 296 at 299 (1932). 
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with the simple statement that, "Grovey v. Townsend11 is over-
ruled."12 And the Girouard decision in 1946 was summed up 
in these words: "We conclude that the Schwimmer,13 Macintoshu 
and Bland15 cases do not state the correct rule of law."16 
Other overrulings are expressed more hesitantly, even apolo-
getically. Here, for example, is the statement in Gordon v. Ogden 
in 1830: "Although that case was decided by a divided court, and 
although we think [it was erroneous] . . . , we should be much 
inclined to adhere to the decision in Wilson vs. Daniel17 had 
not a contrary practice since prevailed."18 In Mason v. Eldred 
in 1867, the 1810 case of Sheehy v. Mandeville19 was overruled 
in these words: "The decision in this [Sheehy] case has never 
received the entire approbation of the profession, and its cor-
rectness has been doubted and its authority disregarded in 
numerous instances by the highest tribunals of different states.''20 
And in The Genesee Chief, Taney used this language: "It is 
the decision in the case of Thomas J efferson21 which mainly 
embarrasses the court in the present inquiry. We are sensible 
of the great weight to which it is entitled. But at the same 
time we are convinced that, if we follow it, we follow an erro-
neous decision into which the court fell .... "22 
Finally, in still other instances of express overrulings, the 
Supreme Court has appeared to disclaim responsibility for its 
action, intimating that the overrulings had already occurred in 
previous decisions. In Olsen v. Nebraska, for example, Justice 
Douglas had this to say: "The drift away from Ribnik v. Mc-
Bride,23 supra, has been so great that it can no longer be deemed 
a controlling authority.''24 Justice Bradley put it this way in 
Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co.: "Subsequent decisions have un-
doubtedly modified the rule followed in this case, and, indeed, 
11295 U.S. 45 (1935). 
12 321 U.S. 649 at 666 (1944). 
13 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). 
14 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). 
15 United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931). 
16 328 U.S. 61 at 69 (1946). 
17 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 401 (1798). 
18 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 33 at 34 (1830). 
19 6 Cranch (IO U.S.) 253 (1810). 
20 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 231 at 236 (1867). 
21 IO Wheat. (23 U.S.) 173 (1825). 
22 12 How. (53 U.S.) 443 at 456 (1851). 
23 277 U.S. 350 (1928). 
24 313 U.S. 236 at 244 (1941). 
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have overruled it, and are more in accordance with the views 
expressed by Mr. Justice Catron [dissenting in Stafford v. Union 
Bank of La.25]."26 An even stronger statement to this effect appears 
in Justice Fuller's opinion in Leisy v. Hardin: "The authority 
of Peirce v. New Hampshire27 ••• must be regarded as having 
been distinctly overthrown by the numerous cases hereinafter 
referred to."28 And then Justice Fuller analyzed those "numerous 
cases" to prove his point. · 
Footnotes to a dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis and 
to an address and a book by Justice Douglas add ten more cases 
to the list of Supreme Court decisions which have been over-
ruled-cases in addition to the seventy expressly overruled. The 
fruits of Brandeis' research in this area are found in notes I, 2 
and 4 of his dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.29 in 
1932. But of the 42 cases cited in these notes, only three are 
pertinent additions. Twenty-nine overrulings are listed, includ-
ing 26 which are express; and Brandeis cites 13 decisions which 
have been qualified rather than overruled by subsequent Supreme 
Court dictates. The three "non-express" overrulings cited by 
Brandeis were in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R. R. Co. 
v. Letson (1844),30 The Belfast (1868),31 and Pollock v. Farmers' 
Loan & Trust (1895).32 
Justice Douglas, who more than any other member of the pres-
ent court believes that "stare decisis must give way before the 
dynamic component of history,"33 prepared his lists of overrulings 
for the 1949 Cardozo Lecture34 before The Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York and for his 1956 volume, We the 
Judges.35 The overrulings noted in his address cover two periods 
of Supreme Court history. To the extent that they discuss changes 
in Supreme Court holdings from 1860 to 1890, the list is largely 
repetitious of the Brandeis footnotes. But Douglas' lecture sup-
plements the 1932 Brandeis study by covering the period 1937 to 
25 16 How. (57 U.S.) 135 (1853). 
26 107 U.S. 378 at 387 (1882). 
27 5 How. (46 U.S.) 504 (1847). 
28 135 U.S. 100 at 118 (1890). 
29 285 U.S. 393 at 406-409 (1932). 
so 2 How. (43 U.S.) 497 (1844). 
s17 Wall. (74 U.S.) 624 (1868). 
32 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Despite Brandeis' characterization, there is, of course, much 
doubt as to whether the Pollock case was really an overruling decision. 
83 Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 COL. L. R.Ev. 735 at 737 (1949). 
34 Published as "Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. R.Ev. 735 at 756-758 (1949). 
85 At pp. 32-34. 
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1949, and the notes in We the Judges bring his listing up to 1955. 
Yet Douglas cites only 51 cases and adds only eight instances 
of overrulings which are not express-and one of these, The Bel-
fast,36 is likewise on the Brandeis list. There are two early cases 
which Brandeis did not classify in this category, but which Doug-
las does. These overruling cases are Trebilcock v. Wilson (1871)37 
and Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois (1886).38 The other five 
instances characterized as overrulings by Douglas occur in the 
more recent decisions of Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB (1941),39 
United States v. Classic (1941),40 Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. 
(1941),41 Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continent Co. (1944)42 and 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn. (1944).43 
There are ten additional cases which the authors believe to be 
obvious instances in which the Supreme Court had overruled it-
self by the end of its 1956 term. Two of these occurred subse-
quent to the Brandeis-Douglas studies: Gayle v. Browder in 
195644 and the rehearing in Reid v. Covert in 1957.45 Four of the 
other overrulings, like Reid v. Covert, involved rehearings46 and 
the other four47 are additions to (and represent disagreement 
with) the Brandeis-Douglas lists. 
While these 90 examples of Supreme Court overrulings con-
stitute the largest list ever compiled on the subject,48 they do not 
encompass every instance in which the Court has specifically 
changed its collective mind. There are also 15 cases in which the 
36 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 624 (1868). 
3712 Wall. (79 U.S.) 687 (1871). 
38 118 U.S. 557 (1886). 
39 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
40 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
41314 U.S. 118 (1941). 
42 320 U.S. 661 (1944). 
43 322 U.S. 533 (1944). There is a serious question whether the South-Eastern Under-
writers Assn. case was really an overruling, and it is listed here only to make the Douglas 
classification complete. 
44 352 U.S. 903 (1956). 
45 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
46 Chesapeake &: Ohio Ry. Co. v. Leitch, 276 U.S. 429 (1928); Railroad Commission v. 
Pacific Gas Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938); Halliburton Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946); and 
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947). 
47 Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. (65 U.S.) 427 (1861); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. 
United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); and Ott v. 
Mississippi Bargeline, 336 U.S. 169 (1949). 
48 Other important lists of Supreme Court overrulings, which largely duplicate the 
Brandeis-Douglas studies, include: Reed, J., majority opinion in Smith v. Allwright, 321 
U.S. 649, 665, note 10 (1944); PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 300, 301 (1948); Bernhardt, 
"Supreme Court Reversals on Constitutional Issues," 34 CoRN. L. Q. 55 at 56-59 (1948). 
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Court reversed prior orders denying certiorari. 49 And there are 
hundreds of cases in which the Supreme Court has taken at least 
a "departure" from former dictates. 
III 
0VERRULINGS AND "EROSION" 
Most students of Supreme Court law-especially of constitu-
tional law-are far more interested in the erosion of Supreme 
Court doctrine than in overrulings. They are deeply concerned 
with something called judicial discretion, judicial statesmanship 
or judicial law-making-and are primarily interested in the 
process by which former decisions are avoided or evaded in devel-
oping new doctrine. They are, of course, aware of the many 
opinions which have ignored decisions of the past on the same 
subject-even when those decisions were diligently argued by 
counsel. And these students are similarly aware of the techniques 
of opinion writers in disposing of past decisions by separating 
what they call holdings from what they call dicta, and in dis-
tinguishing cases on supposed differences in facts. These are the 
students who continually look behind expressed rationale. They 
find erosion of Supreme Court doctrine as they question whether 
the old and new cases could have been decided as they were by 
the same nine men on the same day. 
It is not always easy to separate instances of overrulings from 
instances of erosion. Such classification is arbitrary at best. For, as 
pointed out by Justice Douglas, "the distinguishing of prece-
dents is often a gradual and reluctant way of overruling cases."110 
And, as Justice Brandeis observed, "Movement in constitutional 
interpretation and application-often involving no less striking 
departures from doctrines previously established-takes place also 
without specific overruling or qualification of the earlier cases."111 
49 The reversals which finally granted certiorari were Paramount Publix Corp. v. 
American Tri-Ergon Corp., 293 U.S. 528 (1934); Douglas v. Willcuts, 295 U.S. 722 (1935); 
New World Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 654 (1940); Neuberger v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 310 U.S. 655 (1940); Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel. 
Esenwein, 322 U.S. 725 (1944); McCullough v. Karamerer Corp., 322 U.S. 766 (1944); 
Tomkins v. Missouri, 322 U.S. 725 (1944); Hickman v. Taylor, 328 U.S. 876 (1946); Gardner 
v. New Jersey, 328 U.S. 876 (1946); Madison Avenue Corp. v. Asselta, 329 U.S. 817 (1946); 
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 330 U.S. 852 (1947); Alaska 
Juneau Gold Mining Co. v. Robertson, 331 U.S. 793 (1947); United States ex rel. Eichen-
laub v. Watkins, 337 U.S. 955 (1949); Clark v. Manufacturers Trust, 337 U.S. 953 (1949); 
Sacher v. United States, 342 U.S. 858 (1951). 
50 Douglas, "Stare Decisis,'' 49 CoL. L. REv. 735 at 747 (1949). 
Ill Dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 at 408 (1932). 
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Where Supreme Court doctrine undergoes gradual changes 
over long periods of time, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint 
the decision which results in the actual, practical overruling. 
Tigner v. Texas'2 must be cited as the case which overruled 
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.153 But Justice Frankfurter, 
writing for the majority, clearly recognized the dwindling in-
fluence of the prior determination as a constitutional precedent. 
"Connolly's case," he wrote in Tigner v. Texas, "has been worn 
away by the erosion of time, and we are of opinion that it is no 
longer controlling."154 
The problem of designating the actual overruling is even 
more difficult in the desegregation decisions. Plessy v. Ferguson,llr, 
the 1896 case which upheld racial discrimination where con-
ditions were "separate but equal," died as a precedent long before 
the current spate of Supreme Court decisions on the issue. But 
when was Plessy v. Ferguson overruled? The last Supreme Court 
case which in any way upheld a racial classification was Korematsu 
v. United States in 1944.56 But this decision, based on wartime 
powers and wartime emergencies, received no solace from the 
Plessy doctrine and could in no way be considered a determin-
ation in the Plessy spirit. The last decision of the Supreme Court 
consistent with the Plessy spirit-but by no means a reaffirmance 
of the Plessy holding-was Gong Lum v. Rice in 1927.57 Thus, 
with the possible exception of the K.orematsu determination, it 
can safely be said that every Supreme Court decision since 1927 
involving racial discrimination constituted some erosion of the 
Plessy doctrine. 
But it was virtually impossible to classify Plessy v. Ferguson 
as overruled until the school desegregation decision of Brown v. 
Board of Education in 1954. And even that decision was ques-
tionable on the point of overruling. Chief Justice Warren's unan-
imous opinion took pains to avoid an overruling statement. 
Further, in the absence of later cases which clarified the meaning 
of the Brown decision, it could well have been argued that "sep-
arate but equal" was still reasonable in transportation (Plessy), 
even if it was not reasonable in the public schools (Brown). 
52 310 U.S. 141 (1940). 
53 184 U.S. 540 (1902). 
54 310 U.S. 141 at 147 (1940). In a similar vein, see cases cited, notes 23 to 28 supra. 
See also Louisville Railroad Co. v. Letson, 2 How. (43 U.S.) 497 at 554-555 (1844). 
55 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
56 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
57 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
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The decision which must be classified as the one overruling 
Plessy v. Ferguson was Gayle v. Browder in 1956.58 For Gayle, 
like Plessy, involved transportation, and the facts were as similar 
as one could expect in two different cases before the Supreme 
Court. Yet even here there was no express overruling. The entire 
Supreme Court decision was set forth in a per curiam opinion 
of two brief sentences: "The motion to affirm is granted and the 
judgment is affirmed. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 
877; Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879." 
Sometimes there is no Gayle v. Browder to assist the classifier 
who seeks the case which turns erosion into an overruling. Where 
is the decision, for example, which marks the end of such dis-
credited and eroded opinions as Gitlow v. New York59 and Whit-
ney v. California?60 The most clear-cut denunciation of the doc-
trine expressed in those cases appears in Chief Justice Vinson's 
opinion in Dennis v. United States.61 Wrote the Chief Justice: 
"Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has ex-
pressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases, there is 
little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined to the 
Holmes-Brandeis [ dissenting] rationale. " 62 And Vinson then cites 
nine cases in support of his position.63 
It is impossible, however, to classify Dennis v. United States 
as a case overruling the Whitney and Gitlow decisions. Nor is 
it possible to cite numerous other instances of erosion as strong 
enough to constitute overrulings. Brandeis recognized this prob-
lem in his famous footnotes on the general subject in Burnet 
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.64 There he lists sixteen striking ex-
amples of "qualifying" opinions-all of which are certainly close 
to overrulings, but which Brandeis and the authors have hesi-
tated to place in this category.65 
58 352 U.S. 903 (1956). 
59 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
60 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
61341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
62 Id. at 507. 
63 Ibid. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 104-106 (1940); Carlson v. California, 
310 U.S. 106 at 113 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 at 308, 311 (1940); 
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 at 260-263 (1941); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 
at 589-590 (1943); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 639 
(1943); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 530 (1945); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 
at 333-336 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 at 373 (1947). 
64 285 U.S. 393 at 406-409 (1932). 
65 Id. at 406-408, notes 1 and 2. 
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Nor should a case like Skinner v. Oklahoma66 be classified 
as having overruled Buck v. Bell.61 True, if the concurring 
opinion of Jackson had been the majority opinion rather than 
that of Douglas, there would have been an express overruling. 
Such, however, was not the situation. True also, if both cases 
had been before the Supreme Court on the same day and had the 
Skinner philosophy prevailed, Buck v. Bell would probably have 
been decided differently. But this, of course, does not amount 
to an overruling. 
Finally, there are instances of erosion which are so recent-
and so subject to re-definition-that it would be presumptuous 
to apply the overruling label. Yates v. United States68 in 1957 
resulted in the reversal of 14 convictions for conspiracy to violate 
the Smith Act. It distinguished the Dennis69 case of 1957 which 
had affirmed the conviction under the Smith Act of the so-called 
first-string Communist leaders. Thus the Yates case is certainly 
not an example of an express overruling. And whether it can 
be classified as any kind of overruling will depend upon other 
Communist conspiracy cases yet to come which will explain just 
what the Yates decision means. 
IV 
STATISTICS AND PERSONALITIES 
The first overruling decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States was handed down in 1810 in Hudson v. Guestier.10 
By a 4-1 vote, with Justice Brockholst Livingston delivering the 
majority opinion and Chief Justice John Marshall the lone dis-
senter, the Court overruled the two-year-old decision of Chief 
Justice Marshall in Rose v. Himely.71 At issue was the right of 
French warships to seize American vessels trading with the 
revolutionary forces of French-owned Santo Domingo-and the 
Court finally upheld this right. 
But what was far more important was that a supposedly 
Marshall-dominated Court, unmoved by a Marshall dissent, had 
66 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
67 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
68 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
69 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
70 6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 281 (1810). 
714 Cranch (8 U.S.) 241 (1808). 
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overturned a Marshall decision in establishing the right of the 
Supreme Court to re-evaluate and overrule its prior determin-
ations. And there are today at least ninety precedents sustaining 
this right-up to and including the twin cases of Reid v. Covert 
and Kinsella v. Krueger72 in 1957. 
Rose v. Himely, decided in 1808, was not the earliest Supreme 
Court case to meet eventual overruling. Hylton v. United States78 
in 1796 was law for 99 years-until the "overruling" (according to 
Brandeis' characterization)73a in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &-
Trust74 in 1895. Wilson v. Daniel,75 a 1798 case, was overruled by 
Gordon v. Ogden76 in 1830; and the 1806 decision in Strawbridge 
v. Curtiss77 was overruled in 1844 in Louisville, Cincinnati &-
Charleston R. R. Co. v. Letson.78 
While Hylton v. United States survived for 99 years, it was 
not the longest-lived of the Supreme Court cases overruled. The 
doctrine of City of New York v. Miln,79 a 6 to 1 decision in 1837, 
was not overruled until the unanimous decision in Edwards v. 
California80 in 1941-104 years later. Dobbins v. Erie County81 
in 1842 was overruled 97 years later by the 1939 case of Graves v. 
New York ex rel. O'Keefe.82 And Swift v. Tyson,83 another 1842 
decision, was law until Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins84 in 1938, a 
period of 96 years. 
At the other extreme are eight Supreme Court decisions 
which were overruled in less than a year. Seven of these cases 
were reversed on rehearings-one, Thibaut v. Car &- Gen-eral 
Ins. Corp.,85 within 42 days. The eighth case was the 1942 
decision in Jones v. Opelika86 which was overruled eleven months 
later by Murdock v. Pennsylvania87 and a per curiam opinion in 
72 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
73 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) I7l (1796). 
73a See note 32 supra. 
74 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
75 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 401 (1798). 
76 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 33 (1830). 
77 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 267 (1806). 
782 How. (43 U.S.) 497 (1844). 
79 11 Pet. (36 U.S.) 102 (1837). 
so 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
81 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 434 (1842). 
82 306 U.S. 466 (1939). 
83 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842). 
84 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
85 332 U.S. 751 (1947), and 332 U.S. 828 (1947). 
86 316 U.S. 584 (1942). 
87 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
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a rehearing of Jones v. Opelika88 based on the reasoning of the 
Murdock decision. 
The average (mean) life-span of cases overruled is 24 years. 
The median figure is 17 years. 
Of the 90 overruling decisions, the largest percentage was 
rendered by the Stone Court from 1941 to 1946. There were 21 
overrulings during this five-year period, as compared with only 
7 overrulings down to the end of the Civil War. More than half 
(47) of the overruling opinions were handed down since 1937. 
Here is a breakdown by Court: 
Number 
Chief Justice Years Overrulings 
Jay 1789-1795 0 
Rutledge 1795 0 
Ellsworth 1796-1800 0 
Marshall 1801-1835 3 
Taney 1836-1864 4 
Chase 1864-1873 5 
Waite 1874-1888 12 
Fuller 1888-1910 4 
White 1910-1921 5 
Taft 1921-1930 5 
Hughes 1930-1941 15 
Stone 1941-1946 21 
Vinson 1946-1953 13 
Warren 1953-1957 3 
90 
The 90 overruling decisions either expressly or impliedly 
overruled 122 decisions. Thus there were 122 old (overruled) 
cases in which dissenters might have argued for the contrary doc-
trine later accepted by the Court. Conversely, there were 90 new 
( overruling) cases in which dissenters might have argued stare 
decisis. In total, there were 212 overruling and overruled cases in 
which dissents might have been written. 
Actually, there were dissents in 131 cases. In five of the old 
overruled cases, however, the Supreme Court handed down 4-4 
per curiam affirmances, and the dissenting votes were not re-
corded. The other 81 opinions were unanimous. Dissents were 
recorded in 54 of the 90 overruling decisions and 72 of the 122 
overruled decisions-a total of 126 cases having recorded dissents. 
88 319 U.S. 103 (1943). 
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Fifty-nine of the 91 justices who served on the Court as of the 
end of the 1957 Term dissented in the 126 cases in which dissent-
ing votes were recorded. There were 181 dissenters in the old 
(overruled) cases arguing for the views later adopted by the Court. 
There were 130 dissenters in the new (overruling) cases in which 
the dissenters argued for the affirmance of prior doctrine. 
Here are these same figures in tabular form: 
(New) (Old) 
Overruling Overruled 
Number of- Cases Cases Total 
Decisions Noted 90 122 212 
Unanimous Decisions 36 45 81 
Decisions with Dissents 54 77 131 
Decisions with Dissenters 
Not Recorded 5 5 
Decisions with 
Dissenters Recorded 54 72 126 
Dissenting Votes Recorded 130 181 311 
The "great dissenters" were Brandeis, Stone, Holmes and 
Frankfurter. Brandeis dissented in 22 old (overruled) decisions 
and in two new (overruling) decisions. Stone registered 20 dis-
sents-15 in the old cases and five in the new. Holmes was a dis-
senter in 18 cases, 16 of them cases overruled. Frankfurter dis-
sented in only three cases which were later overruled, but dis-
agreed with the majority in 13 of the new (overruling) decisions. 
The tabulation on judges who dissented six times or more is 
as follows: 
DISSENTING IN 
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Black 5 4 9 
Miller 5 3 8 
Hughes 7 1 8 
Burton 2 6 8 
Catron 7 0 7 
Butler 0 7 7 
Murphy 2 5 7 
Bradley 3 3 6 
McK.enna 4 2 6 
VanDevanter 3 3 6 
Cardozo 6 0 6 
Douglas 4 2 6 
V 
THE RIGHT To BE WRONG 
Despite the fiction of judicial infallibility, judges have been 
known to be wrong. It may be useful to foster the illusion that 
"judges know more law than anybody else" and that "courts al-
ways decide every question correctly"89-but such illusions have 
value only if they are recognized as illusions. It is just not true 
that "the law makes few, if any, mistakes."90 "To err is human." 
And, as at least one court has observed, "after all, judges are 
human."91 
On seventy occasions, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has expressly overruled its decisions of the past. In at least twenty 
more cases, the Supreme Court has made a decision which can 
only be interpreted as an overruling. And this adds up to ninety 
public confessions of error. For even if the Supreme Court had 
erred in handing down its overruling opinions, there still would 
be ninety instances of being wrong. Thus Supreme Court error 
must be recognized as fact and. analyzed as fact. And this fact 
raises certain basic quesions: 
1. Does the Supreme Court have the "right" to overrule 
its prior decisions? 
2. Assuming that this "right" exists, under what condi-
tions should it be exercised? 
89 Levitan, "Professional Trade-Secrets: What Illusions Should Lawyers Cultivate?" 
43 A.B.A.J. 628 at 630 (1957). 
90 Hannah v. Lovelace-Young Lumber Co., 159 Ga. 856 at 861, 127 S.E. 225 (1925). 
_ 91 Stoner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115 at 119, 287 N.W. 269 (1939). 
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3. Assuming that this "right" exists, when does the ex-
ercise of this right constitute an abuse of discretion? 
A. The "Right" To Overrule 
There may be a lack of logic in citing precedent for the prop-
osition that precedent may be overruled. Yet such is the logic of 
law and legal analysis. The Supreme Court's ninety overruling 
decisions represent 89 judicial affirmances of the 1810 case of 
Hudson v. Guestier92-and a total of ninety precedents to uphold 
overrulings. It is unlikely that such quantity of opinions could be 
marshaled in support of any other Supreme Court doctrine. 
But authority for this principle is not limited to what the 
United States Supreme Court has said and done. Blackstone took 
the position that a common law judge had the right to overturn 
any precedent which was "flatly absurd" or unjust or plainly in-
convenient. 93 And, in a similar vein, Lord Coke stated that "in-
convenience in the results of a rule established by precedent is 
strong argument to prove that the precedent itself is contrary to 
law."94 
Lord Coke's statement is of particular significance. For even 
if one believes in the immutable nature of the law, there may 
still be a justification for the overruling of precedents. In the 
appropriate case, an overruling may be interpreted as the correc-
tion of a prior misunderstanding as to the meaning of an unchang-
ing legal principle-just as that same overruling may be interpret-
ed as a judge-made change of judge-made law. 
There are, of course, those who decry the existence of over-
rulings-but even they do not deny the right to render such deci-
sions. They are concerned with the abuse of that right. At its 
July 1957 convention, the State Bar of Texas passed a resolution 
deploring "the tendency of the Supreme Court to depart from 
judicial precedent in interpreting the Constitution" ;95 but the 
proposed solution was to require ten years' experience as a 
judge or practicing attorney for nomination to the Court.96 The 
92 6 Cranch (IO U.S.) 281 (1810). 
931 BLACKST. COMM. 4170. See POUND, FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAw 120 (1937). 
94 POUND, FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW 125 (1937). 
95 See 41 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 35 (1957). 
96 It is, of course, highly unlikely that such a requirement would have any effect on 
oven;ulings. The only member of the present Court who has taken a strong stand against 
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Texas Bar was saying that the present Supreme Court shouldn't 
overrule, not that they couldn't. 
From the Supreme Court bench itself have come some of the 
most scathing denunciations of overruling decisions. Dissenting 
in the overruling case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan b Trust Co. in 
1895, Justice (later Chief Justice) White had this to say: 
"The fundamental conception of a judicial body is that 
of one hedged about by precedents which are binding on the 
court without regard to the personality of its members. Break 
down this belief in judicial continuity, and let it be felt that 
on great constitutional questions this court is to depart from 
the settled conclusions of its predecessors, and to determine 
them all according to the mere opinion of those who tempo-
rarily fill its bench, and our Constitution will, in my judg-
ment, be bereft of value and become a most dangerous in-
strument to the rights and liberties of the people."97 
Yet White joined with the majority in four of the five over-
ruling decisions handed down during his eleven years as chief 
justice.98 
Similar comments appear in dissents of Justice Roberts. Here 
is his observation in Smith v. Allwright:99 "The reason for my 
concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced 
about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tri-
bunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for 
this day and train only." 
And again, in Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co. Justice Roberts 
said:100 "The evil resulting from overruling earlier considered 
decisions must be evident. In the present case, the court below 
naturally felt bound to follow and apply the law as clearly an-
nounced by this court. If litigants and lower federal courts are 
not to do so, the law becomes not a chart to govern conduct but 
a game of chance; instead of settling rights and liabilities it 
unsettles them. Counsel and parties will bring and prosecute 
overrulings is Justice Frankfurter-the justice with the least number of years' experience 
as a judge or practicing attorney prior to his Supreme Court appointment. 
97 157 U.S. 429 at 652 (1894). 
os Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 
(1916); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Rosen 
v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918). The fifth overruling decision during this period-a 
decision in which White dissented-was Penna. R. Co. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (1917). 
99 321 U.S. 649 at 669 (1944). 
100 321 U.S. 96 at 112-113 (1944). 
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actions in the teeth of the decisions that such actions are not 
maintainable on the not improbable chance that the asserted 
rule will be thrown overboard. Defendants will not know whether 
to litigate or to settle for they will have no assurance that a de-
clared rule will be followed. But the more deplorable conse-
quence will inevitably be that the administration of justice 
will fall into disrepute. Respect for tribunals must fall when the 
bar and the public come to understand that nothing that has 
been said in prior adjudication has force in a current 
controversy." 
But then Justice Roberts, who had joined with the majority 
in a number of important overruling decisions, 101 qualified his 
objections in these words: "Of course the law may grow to meet 
changing conditions. I do not advocate slavish adherence to 
authority where new conditions require new rules of conduct. 
But this is not such a case."102 
Thus the "right" to overrule, like the existence of at least 
ninety Supreme Court -0verrulings, is a fact. But when is an 
overruling "needed"? And if not "needed," when is an over-
ruling at least "justified"? 
B. To Overrule or Not To Overrule-Basic Policies 
There are no legal limits to the "right" to overrule. Whether 
stare decisis "shall be followed or departed from is a question 
entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called 
upon to consider a question once decided."103 But what are-
or should be-the metes and bounds of this discretion? 
"In deciding whether or not to follow a precedent, the 
Court must eventually harmonize antipathetical goals. A balance 
must be struck between values which are inherent in consistency 
of decision and values which flow from judicial recognition of 
the changing nature and patterns of society. This is judicial labor 
at its highest level."104 And it is judicial labor in which, as Ros-
coe Pound points out, "we must seek principles of change no less 
than principles of stability."105 
101 E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Erie ,R. Co. v. Tompkms, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Classic. 
313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
102 321 U.S. 96 at 113 (1944). 
10s Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205 at 212 (1910). 
104 BLAUSTEIN AND FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 79 (1957). 
1011 POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY l (1923). 
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The metes and bounds of judicial discretion will vary de-
pending upon whether a constitutional issue is involved. For 
there has been less adherence to precedent in the constitutional 
cases. Explained Stone and Cardozo, concurring in a 1936 deci-
sion: "The doctrine of stare decisis, however appropriate and 
even necessary at times, has only a limited application in the 
field of constitutional law."106 
This is as it should be. The most important lesson from 
the pen of Chief Justice Marshall is that "we must never forget 
that it is a constitution we are expounding."107 Justice Douglas 
has amplified this assertion in these words: "The place of stare 
decisis in constitutional law is even more tenuous. A judge look-
ing at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere 
past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers 
above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to sup-
port and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have 
put on it. . . . He cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long 
dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives 
do his thinking for him."108 
Brandeis gives the second basic reason for the "limited ap-
plication" of precedent in constitutional law. "Stare decisis," 
he said, "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it 
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
than that it be settled right. . . . This is commonly true even 
where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correc-
tion can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal 
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is prac-
tically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier de-
cisions. . . . In cases involving the Federal Constitution, the 
position of this Court is unlike that of the highest court of 
England, where the policy of stare decisis was formulated and 
is strictly applied to all classes of cases. Parliament is free to cor-
rect any judicial error; and the remedy may be promptly 
invoked. "109 
Sixty of the Supreme Court's ninety overrulings have been 
in the constitutional law area. 
106 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 at 94 (1936). 
101 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 407 (1819). 
108 Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. REv. 735 at 736 (1949). 
109 Burnet v. Coronado Oil 8e Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 at 406-410 (1932). Emphasis added. 
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VI 
"NECESSARY," "JUSTIFIED" AND "UNWARRANTED" OVERRULING$ 
Supreme Court overrulings can be conveniently divided into 
three categories: (I) those which are necessary; (2) those which 
are not necessary but which may be justified; and (3) those which 
are unwarranted. Such division is arbitrary at best. The various 
arguments under each category tend to merge with others in 
other categories-for many of the arguments are based on differ-
ences in degree rather than differences in kind. But the classi-
fication does clarify analysis. 
A. "Necessary" Overrulings 
There are some cases in which even the most stalwart ad-
herent of stare decisis would agree that overrulings were "nec-
essary." Again classification becomes arbitrary. But it can be 
argued that a precedent should be overruled-
!. Where the Supreme Court must choose between con-
flicting precedents; 
2. Where the Supreme Court must follow a state court's 
interpretation of a state constitution or statute-and that 
interpretation is contrary to the Supreme Court's prior 
decision; 
3. Where the Supreme Court's prior interpretation is 
impracticable, resulting in great hardship or inconvenience; 
4. Where there has been obvious error in the prior Su-
preme Court decision; and 
5. Where an express overruling is merely declaratory 
of a prior virtual overruling. 
All of these arguments, especially the last, require explana-
tion. The first-in which the Supreme Court must choose be-
tween conflicting precedents-is the most apparent. And the over-
ruling in Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co.110 is an excellent ex-
ample of a case in point. Chief Justice Stone posed and settled 
the conflicting precedents issue in the concluding words of the 
Court's opinion: "We cannot follow [The Pinar Del Rio111] ••• 
and also follow The Osceola,112 ••• the cases which it approved 
110 321 U.S. 96 (1944). 
111277 U.S. 151 (1928). 
112 189 U.S. 158 (1903). 
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and Carlisle Packing Go. v. Sandanger.118 • • We prefer to fol-
low the latter as the more consonant with principle and au-
thority."114 Thus the 1928 case of The Pinar Del Rio was 
overruled. Adherence to that precedent, on the other hand, 
would have necessitated the overruling of the Osceola and Car-
lisle:' cases. 
As far as the second argument is concerned, there are, of 
course, many instances in which the United States Supreme 
Court has been called upon to interpret a state constitution or 
statute. And there are likewise instances in which the same 
issues later came before state supreme courts-and where the state 
supreme courts rendered decisions contrary to those of the United 
States Supreme Court. In four cases115 (two involving state con-
stitutions and two involving state statutes) the issue returned once 
again to the Supreme Court of the United States. And in these 
four cases the high tribunal overruled its prior decisions to com-
ply with the state determinations. According to the United States 
Supreme Court, it was necessary to do so. 
Here is language from two of these cases on this necessity 
for overrulings. In Fairfield v. County of Gallatin in 1879, the 
Court had this to say: "And it has been held that this court will 
abandon its former decision construing a State statute if the State 
courts have subsequently given to it a different construction."116 
Likewise, in County of Gass v. Johnston in 1877, the Court 
11S 259 U.S. 255 (1922). 
114 321 U.S. 96 at 105 (1944). 
115 Greene v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 291 (1832), overruling Patton's Lessee v. 
Easton, I Wheat. (14 U.S.) 476 (1816) (state statute); Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 
(65 U.S.) 427 (1861), overruling Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. (49 U.S.) 495 (1850) (state 
statute); County of Cass v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360 (1877), overruling Harshman v. Bates 
County, 92 U.S. 569 (1875) (state constitution); and Fairfield v. County of Gallatin, 100 
U.S. 47 (1879), overruling Town of Concord v. Savings Bank, 92 U.S. 625 (1875) (state 
constitution). 
116 100 U.S. 47 at 54 (1879). Outlining the legal background of Supreme Court ad-
herence to state interpretations of state law, the Court also said (at p. 52): "At a very 
early day it was announced that in cases depending upon the Constitution or statutes 
of a State this court would adopt the construction of the statutes or Constitution given 
by the courts of the State, when that construction could be ascertained. Polk's Lessee v. 
Wendell, 9 Cranch (13 U.S.] 87 [1815]. In Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. [48 U.S.] 812 
[1849], it is declared to be the 'established doctrine that this court will adopt and follow 
the decisions of the State courts in the construction of their own Constitution and statutes, 
when that construction has been settled by the decisions of its highest tribunal.' In Walker 
v. State Harbor Commissioners, 17 Wall. [84 U.S.] 648 [1874], we said, 'This court follows 
the adjudications of the highest court of the State' in the construction of its statutes. 
'Its interpretation is accepted as the true interpretation, whatever may be our opinion 
of its original soundness.' " 
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expressed its holding in these words: " ... as a rule of State 
statutory and constitutional construction, [the Missouri Supreme 
Court's decision] is binding upon us. It follows that our de-
cision in Harshman v. Bates County, in so far as it declares the 
law to be unconstitutional, must be overruled."117 
It can also be argued that an overruling is "necessary" where 
a prior interpretation is impracticable, resulting in great hard-
ship or inconvenience. But whether an overruling based on this 
argument is in fact necessary (or merely "justified" or- even 
"unwarranted") depends upon the extent of that hardship or 
inconvenience. 
Two famous overrulings illustrate this argument. Hepburn 
v. Griswold118 resulted in hardship and would have resulted in 
still more hardship. Swift v. Tyson,119 which originally "did 
no great harm when confined to what Story dealt with,"120 
gradually caused inconvenience and eventually also resulted 
in hardship. 
It was by a 5-4 decision that the Court, in the 1872 Legal 
Tender Cases,121 overruled the 5-3 decision in Hepburn v. Gris-
wold, decided three years earlier. And there certainly would 
not have been an overruling at that time had there not been 
two convenient vacancies on the Supreme Court which were 
immediately filled by proponents of the Legal Tender Acts. But 
the political implications of those appointments had nothing to 
do with the fact of hardship and potential hardship. Here is 
what Justice Strong wrote for the majority in the Legal Tender 
Cases: 
"The debts which have been contracted since February 25, 
1862, constitute, doubtless, by far the greatest portion of the 
existing indebtedness of the country. They have been con-
tracted in view of the acts of Congress declaring treasury 
notes a legal tender .... If now, by our decision, it be es-
tablished that these debts and obligations can be discharged 
only by gold coin . . . ruinous sacrifices, general distress, and 
bankruptcy may be expected. These consequences are too 
obvious to admit of question .... [S]erious as they are 
117 95 U.S. 360 at 369 (1877). 
11s 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 603 (1869). 
119 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) I (1842). 
120 2 HOWE, HOLMES-POLLOCK LE'ITERs 215 (1941). 
12112 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457 (1872). 
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[however, they] must be accepted, if there is a clear incom-
patibility between the Constitution and the legal tender acts. 
But we are unwilling to precipitate them upon the country 
unless such an incompatibility plainly appears."122 
The 1842 decision of Swift v. Tyson was long in bringing 
hardship. But by the time of the overruling opinion of Erie R. 
Co. v. Tompkins123 in 1938, it has imposed an intolerable bur-
den upon litigants, lawyers and the courts. Justice Brandeis em-
phasized this argument at various points in his unanimous 
opm1on: 
"Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 
had revealed its defects, political and social; ... the mischiev-
ous results of the doctrine had become apparent .... Swift 
v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens 
against citizens . . . the doctrine rendered impossible equal 
protection of the law .... The injustice and confusion in-
cident to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson have been repeated-
ly urged. . . ."124 
The fourth argument is that an overruling is "necessary" 
where there has been obvious error in a prior Supreme Court 
decision. There should be no disagreement on this point; but it 
would be hard to find unanimity on what is obvious. The now-
condemned separate-but-equal case of Plessy v. Ferguson125 is 
certainly not an apt illustration. 
Yet it is not difficult to find examples of what might be con-
sidered obvious error. Thirty-seven of the ninety overruling deci-
sions were unanimous-with the justices at least indicating the 
"obviousness" of prior error by sheer weight of numbers. And 
two of these cases contain statements which should leave no doubt 
as to the mistakes of the past. 
The will of Jacob Dawson, for example, was twice before 
the Supreme Court. And both times, with a thirteen-year in-
terval, the Court rendered 9-0 decisions. The overruling opinion 
contained these words: "And this court, on reconsideration of 
the whole matter, with the aid of the various judicial opinions 
upon the subject, and of the learned briefs of counsel, is of 
opinion that the sound construction of this will, . . . is in ac-
122 Id. at 529-531. 
123 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
124 Id. at 74-77. 
125 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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cordance with the conclusion of the state court, and not with 
the former decision of this court, which must, therefore, be con-
sidered as overruled. "126 
An even stronger assertion of prior error appears in a 9-0 
opinion by Justice Miller which overruled another 9-0 opinion 
by Justice Miller, written only two years before. Said the justice: 
"we are now of the opinion, on a fuller argument and more 
mature consideration, that the [former] position is not tenable."127 
There are also cases in which the Supreme Court was so 
unlawyer-like or so unmindful of the consequences of its con-
clusions that the decisions must likewise be regarded as erron-
eous. The Thomas Jefferson128 and Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur 
v. Cauble129 are examples of such cases. 
The Thomas Jefferson was decided in 1825 and was over-
ruled in 1851 by The Genesee Chief.130 At issue was the ad-
miralty jurisdiction of the federal government. The earlier de-
cision had limited such jurisdiction "to the ebb and flow of the 
tide"; the latter decision held that this jurisdiction extended to 
all navigable waters. Wrote Chief Justice Taney: 
"[W]e are convinced that, if we follow ... [The Thomas 
Jefferson], we follow an erroneous decision into which the 
court fell, when the great importance of the question as it 
now presents itself could not be foreseen; and the subject 
did not therefore receive that deliberate consideration which 
at this time would have been given to it by the eminent men 
who presided here when that case was decided. For the 
decision was made in 1825, when the commerce on the rivers 
of the west and on the lakes was in its infancy, and of little 
importance, and but little regarded compared with that of 
the present day."131 
Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion in Toucey v. 
N. Y. Life ·1ns. Co.,132 which not only overruled one aspect of 
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble133 but also criticized it 
126 Roberts v. Lewis, 153 U.S. 367 at 377 (1894), overruling Giles v. Little, 104 U.S. 291 
(1881). 
127 Railway C_o. v. McShane, 22 Wall. (89 U.S.) 444 at 461 (1874), overruling Railway 
Co. v. Prescott, 16Wall. (83 U.S.) 603 (1872). 
12810 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 173 (1825). 
120 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
130 12 How. (53 U.S.) 443 (1851). 
131 Id. at 456. See also note 22 supra. 
132 314 U.S. 118 (1941). 
133 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
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as "sporadic" and "ill-considered." Said Frankfurter: "The Court 
disposed of the ... question in one sentence, citing only one case 
in support of its conclusion, . . . which, as we have seen, was 
not a relitigation case [and therefore not in point].''134 
Fifth and finally, some overrulings are "necessary" to point 
out the fact that prior decisions have already been overruled, but 
that the Court has thus far neglected to say so. These are the 
cases in which the Court asserts that its overrulings are merely 
declaratory of an existing state of the law. 
So in the overruling case of Leisy v. Hardin, the Court took 
the position that, "The authority of Peirce v. New Hampshire1311 
. . . must be regarded as having been distinctly overthrown by 
the numerous cases hereinafter referred to.''136 Similarly, in Bren-
ham v. German American Bank, the Court said: "We, therefore, 
must regard the cases of Rogers v. Burlington131 and Mitchell v. 
Burlington,138 as overruled ... by later cases in this court."139 
The best illustration of the "necessity" for declaratory over-
rulings is found in the wages and hours litigation which came 
before the Supreme Court. At issue was the validity of statutes 
setting minimum wages and maximum hours. Here is what 
happened in these cases: 
Cases Date 
Holden v. Hardy 1898 
Lochner v. New York 1905 
Bunting v. Oregon 1917 
Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital 1923 
West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish 1937 
134 Id. at ll!8-139. 








7-2 169 U.S. 366 
5-4 198 U.S. 45 
5-3 243 U.S. 426 
Denied 5-3 261 U.S. 525 
Upheld 5-4 300 U.S. 379140 
136 135 U.S. 100 at ll8 (1890). See also notes 23 to 28 supra. 
137 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 654 (1866). 
138 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 270 (1867). 
139144 U.S. 173 at 187 (1892). 
140 This is by no means a complete list of the wage and hour cases. Important deci-
sions which upheld statutes setting maximum working hours for women included Muller 
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914); Miller v. 
Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); and Radice v. 
New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924). An important case reaffirming the 1923 decision in Adkins 
v. Children's Hospital was Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
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Thus, in a sense, West Coast Hotel overruled Adkins, which 
had overruled Bunting, which had overruled Lochner, which had 
overruled Holden. Yet Lochner sought to "distinguish" Holden, 
Bunting ignored Lochner, and Adkins discussed Bunting only 
as a historical event. It was not until the decision in West Coast 
Hotel that the Court clarified its position, finally overruling 
Adkins and, by implication, Lochner. 
The various opinions in Adkins reflect the confusion which 
results when the Supreme Court changes its views without an-
nouncing a definite stand on prior decided cases. 
Speaking for the majority, Justice Sutherland wrote that 
Lochner had declared Holden to be "inapplicable"141 and that 
Lochner was still good law. "Subsequent cases [to Lochner]," 
he said, "have been distinguished from that decision, but the 
principles therein stated have never been disapproved."142 
The dissenters took a different view. Chief Justice Taft had 
this to say: "It is impossible for me to reconcile the Bunting Case 
and the Lochner Case and I have always supposed that the Loch-
ner Case was thus overruled sub silentio."143 Holmes was even 
more definite on this point. "But after Bunting," he wrote, "I 
had supposed ... that Lochner v. New York would be allowed 
a deserved repose."1« 
True, the reluctance to overrule doctrine which can be 
avoided has its advantages in terms of judicial flexibility. But 
despite such advantages, there are instances when clarity is 
still more important and where it is "necessary" for the Court 
to express a definite stand by means of an overruling. 
B. "Justified" Overrulings 
By a change in degree, a "necessary" overruling becomes 
merely "justified." 
1. Just as an overruling is "necessary" in resolving prior con-
flicting precedents, so an overruling is at least "justified" where 
the Court must choose between following a precedent and fol-
lowing a contrary philosophy expressed in other cases. The Court 
141261 U.S. 525 at 548 (1923). 
142 Id. at 550. 
H3 Id. at 564. 
144 Id. at 570. 
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in the school segregation case of Brown v. Board of Education145 
and the transportation case of Gayle v. Browder146 finally over-
ruled Plessy v. Ferguson.141 And the Court was severely criticized 
for its departure from this acknowledged precedent. But what 
the critics failed to realize was that adherence to the 1896 case 
of Plessy v. Ferguson would have resulted in a decision contrary 
to the philosophy and spirit of at least four cases involving Negro 
rights in education, decided between 1938 and 1950.148 Faced 
with the task of determining the constitutionality of laws based 
on racial segregation, the Supreme Court could not have recon-
ciled all of the prior cases on the subject. Some decision or de-
cisions had to be overruled-at least in spirit. 
2. Just as an overruling is "necessary" where a prior deci-
sion has resulted in great hardship or inconvenience, so an over-
ruling is at least "justified" where a prior decision fails to meet 
the needs of subsequent times. This is particularly applicable 
in the field of constitutional law. "While the language of the 
Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances of a 
progressive society for which it was designed yield new and 
fuller import to its meaning."149 It was this philosophy which led 
the New Deal and Fair Deal Courts to re-examine the economic 
realities of the complex society which they served and to overrule 
decisions which had not stood the test of time. In 1944, for ex-
ample, the Court re-examined the activities of insurance com-
panies-companies which insured property in many jurisdictions 
and issued coverage for articles moving from state to state. And 
in the 1944 case of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Assn.,150 the Court, at least according to Justice Douglas,150a over-
ruled the 1869 decision in Paul v. Virginia151 which had de-
clared that insurance was not interstate commerce. 
3. Just as it is "necessary" for the Supreme Court to correct 
the obvious errors of the past, so the Court is "justified" in chang-
ing its views after re-examination and reconsideration of prior 
145 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
146 352 U.S. 903 (1956). 
147 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
148 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 
332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
149 Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 at 266 (1957). 
150 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
150a See note 43 supra. 
151 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1869). 
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doctrine. It is, of course, "revolting to have no better reason for 
a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry 
IV."152 And "it is more important that the court should be 
right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases 
than consistent with previous declarations."153 As Justice Reed 
declared in the overruling case of Smith v. Allwright, "when con-
vinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to 
follow precedent."154 Another example of an overruling based 
on this argument is United States v. Nice.155 There the unani-
mous Court had this to say: "We recognize that a different con-
struction was placed upon §6 of the act of 1887 in Matter of 
Heff,156 but after re-examining the question in light of other pro-
visions of the act and of many later enactments clearly reflecting 
what was intended by Congress, we are constrained to hold that 
the decision in that case is not well grounded, and it is accordingly 
overruled.''157 
4. Every overruling is reflective of a judicial change of mind. 
Every overruling means that at least a majority of the Court be-
lieves that a former majority erred in rendering a prior decision. 
When the collective majority in a new decision changes the 
collective mind of the majority in a former decision, it may be 
argued that the overruling was "unwarranted." But when the 
same judges change their minds, the overruling is at least "justi-
fied." An 8-1 decision in West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette158 in 1943 overruled the 8-1 decision in Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis159 in 1940. There were only two 
changes in Court personnel during this period. The Court took 
a different position in the latter case because three of the judges-
Black, Douglas and Murphy-changed their minds. Commenting 
on these decisions, one observer presents the justification argu-
ment in these words: "This may be done without embarrassment 
when the error is confessed by those who joined in the former 
opinion, as in the recent Jehovah's Witness flag salute case."160 
1112 Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 HARv. L. R.Ev. 457 at 469 (1897). 
llS3 Barden v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 154 U.S. 288 at 322 (1894). 
llS4 321 U.S. 649 at 665 (1944). 
llSlS 241 U.S. 591 (1916). 
llSG 197 U.S. 488 (1905). 
1117241 U.S. 591 at 601 (1916). 
158 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
llS9 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
160 Wilson, "Stare Decisis, Quo Vadis? The Orphaned Doctrine in the Supreme Court," 
!! GEO. L. J. 251 at 253 (1945). 
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Under this theory, virtually all of the Supreme Court's reversals 
on rehearings are likewise "justified."161 
C. "Unwarranted" Overrulings 
There is no question of the Supreme Court's "right" to over-
rule. And there is no question but that the exercise of that "right" 
is purely discretionary. Thus it follows that an "unwarranted" 
overruling would be an abuse of judicial discretion. But how 
realistic is a charge of "abuse" when the judicial discretion of 
the Supreme Court knows no limits? For, as Justice Stone pointed 
out, "the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own 
sense of self-restraint."162 
In a strictly legalistic sense, no overrulings are "unwarranted." 
Yet this does not mean that some precedents should not be over-
ruled. And this does not mean that lawyers should not argue that 
an overruling under such-and-such circumstances may be "un• 
warranted." In any event, it can at least be argued that an over-
ruling is inappropriate-
!. Where the Supreme Court fails to give due considera-
tion to the reasoning and analysis which led to the now over-
ruled decision; 
2. Where the Supreme Court fails to give due weight 
to the "values which are inherent in consistency of deci-
sion" -meaning specifically the uniformity, stability and secu-
rity of law upon which there can be reliance; and 
3. Where the overruling results solely from changes in 
Court personnel-the new members having been appointed 
because of their known or promised opposition to prior 
decisions. 
Just as it is "necessary" for the Supreme Court to correct the 
obvious errors of the past, and just as the Supreme Court is "justi-
fied" in changing its views after re-examination and reconsidera-
tion of prior doctrine, so an overruling may be "unwarranted" 
where there has not been adequate evaluation of the reasoning 
and analysis which led to the now overruled decision. 
Antiquity is no guaranty of rectitude. No Court should be 
enslaved by the avowed wisdom of the past or overawed by the 
stature of its predecessors. But this view can be carried to an 
161 See notes 45, 46 and 49 supra. 
162 Dissenting in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I at 79 (1936). 
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undesirable extreme. It is also important that the Court remem-
bers that there were able lawyers who sat on prior Courts, and 
that their judgments should be given due consideration. Certainly 
an overruling is "unwarranted" where the wisdom of able 
judges is ignored. Certainly an overruling is "unwarranted" if 
it disregards the possible unanimity which created prior doctrine 
or disregards the fact that the doctrine was frequently reaffirmed. 
Certainly an overruling is "unwarranted" when a hastily-made 
determination is substituted for a decision made after extensive 
deliberation. 
The 5-3 decision in Hornbuckle v. Toombs163 in 1873 over-
ruled three unanimous decisions: an 8-0 determination in Noonan 
v. Lee164 in 1862, a 10-0 determination in Orchard v. Hughes165 
in 1863, and a 9-0 determination in Dunphy v. Kleinsmith166 in 
1870. This, of course, does not necessarily make the Hornbuckle 
overruling "unwarranted," but it does serve as an example of an 
overruling which the Court should have taken pains to justify. 
And all that the Court said was that, "On a careful review of the 
whole subject, we are not satisfied that those [ overruled] decisions 
are founded on a correct view of the law.''167 
The Legal Tender Cases168 were undoubtedly correctly 
decided. This, however, is a conclusion based on hindsight. Con-
temporary lawyers might well have questioned the extent of 
judicial deliberation which led to this overruling decision. As 
Chief Justice Chase pointed out in his dissent, "A majority of 
the court, five to four, in the opinion which has just been read, 
reverses the judgment rendered by the former majority of five 
to three, in pursuance of an opinion formed after repeated argu-
ments, at successive terms, and careful consideration. . . .''169 
Frankfurter and Burton sum up this argument in their dis-
sents in Commissioner v. Church.170 This was a 5-3 decision in 
1949, overruling the 9-0 decision of May v. Heiner171 in 1930. 
Wrote Frankfurter: "If such a series of decisions, viewed in all 
their circumstances, as that which established the rule in May v. 
163 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 648 (1873). 
164 2 Black (67 U.S.) 499 (1862). 
165 1 Wall. (68 U.S.) 73 (1863). 
166 11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 610 (1870). 
167 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 648 at 653 (1873). 
168 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457 (1872). 
169 Id. at 572. 
170 335 U.S. 632 (1949). 
171281 U.S. 238 (1930). 
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Heiner, is to have only contemporaneous value, the wisest deci-
sions of the present Court are assured no greater permanence."172 
Burton amplified this statement: " ... this Court will exercise 
extreme self-restraint in using its power of self-reversal. . . . I 
find nothing sufficient to justify the reversal of this Court's orig-
inal construction 18 years after this Court approved it unan-
imously and 17 years after this Court unanimously reaffirmed 
that approval."173 
The basic opposition to overrulings is couched in terms of re-
liance. For reliance is the key factor in any consideration of the 
"values which are inherent in consistency of decision. "174 And 
even the most outspoken adherents of the right to overrule con-
cede the necessity of making judicial determinations upon which 
courts, lawyers and the public may rely. "Stare decisis," wrote 
Brandeis, "is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it 
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than 
that it be settled right."175 "Stare decisis," wrote Douglas, "pro-
vides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange their 
affairs with confidence."176 
The importance of reliance has even led the Supreme Court 
to render what it considered to be "wrong" decisions rather than 
to hand down overrulings which might cause confusion or "un-
fortunate practical results." Helvering v. Griffiths111 and Davis 
v. Department of Labor118 are examples of such determinations. 
The 5 to 3 majority in H elvering v. Griffiths refused to re-
consider the discredited decision in Eisner v. Macomber.171 
Wrote Jackson for the majority: "To rip out of the past seven 
years of tax administration a principle of law on which both 
Government and taxpayers have acted would produce readjust-
ments and litigation so extensive we would contemplate them 
with anxiety . . . a long period of accommodations to an older 
decision sometimes requires us to adhere to an unsatisfactory rule 
to avoid unfortunate practical results from a change."180 
Another discredited decision, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jen-
112 335 U.S. 632 at 675 (1949). 
173 Id. at 699. 
174 Note 104 supra. 
175 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 at 406 (1932). 
176 Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. R.Ev. 735 at 736 (1949). 
177 318 U.S. 371 (1943). 
11s 317 U.S. 249 (1942). 
179 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
1so 318 U.S. 371 at 403 (1943). 
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sen,181 was before the Court in Davis v. Department of Labor. 
Black, writing for the majority, avoided the Jensen result by 
limiting that precedent to the facts. Chief Justice Stone, the sole 
dissenter, agreed with the majority conclusion, but stated that 
he could not join in the opinion unless the Jensen case were over-
ruled. And here is what Frankfurter wrote in his concurring 
opm1on: 
"Any legislative scheme that compensates workmen or their 
families for industrial mishaps should be capable of· simple and 
dependable enforcement. That was the aim of Congress when 
... it afforded to harbor-workers the benefits of state workmen's 
compensation laws .... But Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen ... 
frustrated this purpose. Such a desirable end cannot now be 
achieved merely by judicial repudiation of the Jensen doctrine. 
Too much has happened in the twenty-five years since that ill-
starred decision .... Therefore, until Congress sees fit to attempt 
another comprehensive solution of the problem, this Court can 
do no more than bring some order out of the remaining judicial 
chaos as marginal situations come before us."182 
. Overrulings may be even more "unwarranted" when reliance 
is in conflict with what might be termed "fashions in scholar-
ship." There is much merit in Justice Black's contention that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, was not designed to 
protect corporations. And this is what he argued in his dissent 
in the 1938 case of Conn·ecticut General Co. v. Johnson.183 But 
the majority refused to overrule the long line of judicial pro-
nouncements, dating back to the 1886 decision in Santa Clara 
C.o. v. Southern Pacific Railroad,184 which had declared corpora-
tions to be "persons" under the amendment. Assuming that 
Black is correct on the basis of now recognized legal scholarship, 
and supposing that he could convince a majority of the Court 
to overrule all of the decisions holding corporations to be "per-
sons," what judicial action would be proper if as yet undiscovered 
evidence were unearthed indicating that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended to include corporations after all? What would 
happen if the Co~rt were to reinterpret present doctrine on the 
basis of the highly-commended and yet hotly disputed legal 
181244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
182 317 U.S. 249 at 258, 259 (1942). 
183 303 U.S. 77 at 83-90 (1938). 
184 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
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scholarship of William W. Crosskey in his Politics and the Consti-
tution?185 Surely the desire for the consistency, uniformity, stabil-
ity and security of the law upon which there can be reliance 
would make overrulings "unwarranted" under these circum-
stances. 
There may be a middle-of-the-road position which would re-
solve the change-consistency conflict. It was the view of Cardozo 
and some other legal scholars that courts should satisfy the need 
for legal change by rendering prospective overrulings-giving 
judgment in a particular case in conformity with an old rule, 
but announcing that a different rule would be followed in sub-
sequent cases.186 Justice Roberts indicated his approval of this 
idea in his dissent in Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co.187 He took 
the position that certain overrulings would "leave the courts 
below on an uncharted sea of doubt and difficulty ... unless in-
deed a modern instance grows into a custom of members of this 
court to make public announcement of a change in views and to 
indicate that they will change their votes on the same question 
when another case comes before the court. "188 The "modern 
instance" to which Roberts referred was the 1932 case of Great 
Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Co.189 which upheld the right of 
the Supreme Court of Montana190 to make such a prospective 
overruling. 
The third and final argument is that overrulings are "un-
warranted" when they result solely from changes in Court person-
nel-the new members having been appointed because of their 
known or promised adherence or opposition to prior decisions. 
This is something quite different from an individual change-of-
185 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1953). 
186 Cardozo, Address before the New York State Bar Association, Jan. 22, 1932. In 
1932 N. Y. STATE B. AssN. REP. 263,293,294. 
187 321 U.S. 96 (1944). 
188 Id. at 113. 
189 287 U.S. 358 (1932). 
190 The Supreme Court decision in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Co. affirmed 
the decision in Sunburst Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 216, 7 P. (2d) 927 (1932), 
which had followed the prospective overruling announced and discussed in the companion 
case of Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 194, 7 P. (2d) 
919 (1932). Many comments have been written on this subject including: Freeman, "The 
Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision," 18 
CoL. L. R.Ev. 230 (1918); Notes, 60 HARv. L. R.Ev. 437 (1947), 25 VA. L. R.Ev. 210 (1938); 
Snyder, "Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions," 35 ILL. L. R.Ev. 121 (1940); 
von Moschzisker, "Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort." 37 HARV. L. R.Ev. 409 (1924). 
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mind. And this is something quite different from a general 
change in the Court's position due to the appointment of justices 
whose general views of the law differ from those of their 
predecessors. 
The argument is a good one-but only in theory. Justice 
Jackson can be quoted for the proposition that "constitutional 
precedents are accepted only at their current valuation and have 
a mortality rate almost as high as their authors."191 But this is 
not necessarily wrong. The evil exists only where appointments 
are based on an expected or pledged judicial vote on a certain 
issue. And this is difficult, if not impossible, to establish. 
Some Southern spokesmen have asserted that Chief Justice 
Warren's appointment was predicated on his promise to desegre-
gate the schools.192 And there was much criticism when the ap-
pointment of Justice Rutledg~ to replace the retiring Justice 
Byrnes resulted in a 5-4 overruling in Jones v. Opelika193 of the 
5-4 decision in that same case194 only eleven months before. And 
some New Deal legislation met a more favorable judicial recep-
tion after President Roosevelt was able to replace a number of 
the "nine old men" with his appointees. Yet in none of these 
instances was there any real evidence of an appointment based 
on a promise to decide any particular case in any particular way. 
True, most chief executives tend to appoint justices who share 
their general political and social views. But this is certainly not 
a guaranty of future judicial expression. President R9osevelt 
never could have predicted so conservative a Frankfurter; Presi-
dent Eisenhower must be surprised at so liberal a Warren. And 
President Truman was actually outraged when two of his four 
appointees-Burton and Clark-voted against the Government 
in the Steel Seizure Case.195 
Perhaps the best illustration of judicial appointments de-
signed to achieve a particular result on a particular issue occurred 
in connection with the Legal Tender Cases.196 Hepburn v. Gris-
wold197 was decided by the 5-3 vote of an eight-man Court. Justice 
191 Jackson, "The Task of Maintaining Our Liberties; The Role of the Judiciary," 
g9 A.B.A.J. 961 at 962 (1953). 
192 BLAUSTEIN AND FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 13-14 (1957). 
193 319 U.S. 103 (1943). 
194 316 U.S. 584 (1942). 
195Youngstown Sheet&: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579.(1952). 
19612 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457 (1872). 
197 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 603 (1869). 
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Grier, one of the five-man majority, resigned shortly thereafter. 
And then President Grant named Justices Bradley and Strong 
to create a nine-man Court. The result was the overruling in the 
Legal Tender Cases by a 5--4 vote, with "no change in the opin-
ions of those who concurred in the former judgment.''198 There 
was no question of Grant's desire for an overruling; and there 
was no doubt that the Court was increased in size to facilitate 
such overrulings. But whether Bradley and Strong were ap-
pointed because of promises to overrule or because it was known 
that they would vote to overrule is another matter. Evidence both 
for and against this proposition is inconclusive. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
Here then are the basic data on the ninety overruling deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In these pages-
and in the Appendix. which follows-are the statistics. Here, too, 
is a discussion of the judicial discretion which leads to overrul-
ings, and a presentation of some of the criteria which determine 
when the exercise of that discretion was "necessary," "justified" 
or possibly "unwarranted.'' 
Here also is a plea for more definite and expressed overrul-
ings-and a plea for the proposition that it is "the duty of every 
judge and every court to examine its own decisions, . . . without 
fear, and to revise them without reluctance.''199 For there is 
nothing wrong with a public confession of error. It is, of course, 
far more important that the Supreme Court be right than that 
it be consistent. It is far more important that the law be definite 
than that discredited and outmoded doctrine be permitted to 
survive. 
"[W]e worry ourselves overmuch about the enduring con-
sequences of our errors," wrote Cardozo. "They may work a little 
confusion for a time. In the end, they will be modified or cor-
rected or their teachings ignored. The future takes care of such 
things."200 But the future does not take care of such things un-
less the courts act. The problem is what the role of overrulings 
should be in that future. 
19812 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457 at 572 (1872). 
199 Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N.Y. 257 at 261 (1850). 
200 CARI>ozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921). 
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Dobbins v. Erie County 1842 9-0 
Collector v. Day 1870 8-1 
New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves 1937 8-0 
Brush v. Commissioner 1937 7-2 
Greene v. Neal's Lessee 1832 6-1 
overruling 16 E 
Patton's Lessee v. Easton 1816 7-0 
Powell's Lessee v. Harmon 1829 6-0 
Halliburton Co. v. Walker 
(Rehearing) 1946 8-1 
overruling 11 mos. 0 
Halliburton Co. v. Walker 1946 4-4 
Helvering v. Hallock 1940 7-2 
overruling 6 E 
Helverlng v. St. Louis Union Trust 1936 5-4 
Co. 
Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. 1935 5-4 
Helvering v. Mountain Producers 
Corp. 1938 5-2 
overruling 16 E 
Gillespie v. Oklahoma 1922 6-3 
Burnet v. Coronado 011 & Gas Co. 1932 5-4 
Hornbuckle v. Toombs 1873 6-3 
overruling 11 E 
Noonan v. Lee 1862 8-0 
Orchard v. Hughes 1863 10-0 
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Frankfurter Roberts, McReynolds 
Sutherland Stone, Hughes, Brandeis, 
Cardozo 
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Cardozo 
Hughes Butler, McReynolds 
Holmes Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke 
McReynolds Brandeis, Roberts, 
Cardozo, Stone 




278 U.S. 349 
130 U.S. 416 
3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 33 
3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 401 
306 U.S. 466 
16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 434 
11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 113 
299 U.S. 401 
300 U.S. 362 
6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 291 
1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 476 
2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 241 
329 U.S. 1 
326 U.S. 696 
309 U.S. 106 
296 U.S. 39 
296 U.S. 48 
303 U.S. 876 
257 U.S. 501 
285 U.S. 398 
18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 648 
2 Black (67 U.S.) 499 
l Wall. (68 U.S.) 73 


















Oases Dates! Aue Oate-gory• 
Hudson v. Guestler 1810 
overruling 2 E 
Rose v. Himely 1808 
In re Disbarment of Isserman 
(Rehearing) 1954 
overruling 6mos. E 
In re Disbarment of Isserman 1953 
Jones v. Opelika 1943 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania 1943 
overruling llmos. E 
Jones v. Opelika. 1942 
Kilbourn v. Thompson 1880 
overruling 59 E 
Anderson v. Dunn 1821 
Kountze v. Oma.ha Hotel Co. 1882 
overruling 29 E 
Stafford v. Union Bank of Louisiana. 1858 
Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry, Co, 1923 
overruling 17 E 
Ex parte Wisner 1906 
Legal Tender Cases1 1872 
overruling 3 E 
Hepburn v. Griswold 1869 
Leloup v. Port of Mobile 1888 
overruling 16 E 
Osborne v. Mobile 1872 
Leisy v. Hardin 1890 
overruling 43 El 
Peirce v. New Hampshire 1847 
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Field, Nelson 
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6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 281 
4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 241 
348 U.S. 1 
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319 U.S. 103 
819 U.S. 105 
816 U.S. 584 
103 U.S. 168 
6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204 
107 U.S. 378 
16 How. (57 U.S.) 185 
260 U.S. 653 
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12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457 
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127 U.S. 640 
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Loulsvllle, Cincinnati & Charleston 
R, R. Co. v. Letson 1844 8-0 
overruling 38 B 
Strawbridge v. Curtiss 1806 5-0 
Bank of the United States v. 1809 6-0 
Deveaux 
Commercial & R. R. Bank v. Slocum 1840 9-0 
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Co. 
(Rehearing) 1947 5-4 
overruling 11 mos. 0 
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Co. 1946 4-4 
Madden v. Kentucky 1940 7-2 
overruling 5 E 
Colgate v. Harvey 1935 6-3 
Mahnlch v. Southern S. S. Co. 1944 7-2 
overruling 16 E 
Plamals v. The Plnar Del Rio 1928 9-0 
Mason v. Eldred 1867 8-0 
overruling 57 E 
Sheehy v. Mandeville 1810 5-0 
Mercold Corporation v. 
Mid-Continent Co. 1944 5-4 
overruling 34 D 
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking 
Machine Co. (2) 1909 9-0 
Morgan v. United States 1885 8-0 
overruling 17 E 
Texas v. White 1868 5-3 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co. 1917 6-3 
overruling 5 E 
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Chase, S. P. Grier, Swayne, Miller 
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Lurton White, Hughes, Lamar 
2 How. (48 U.S.) 497 
3 Crnnch (7 U.S.) 267 
5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 61 
14 Pet. (89 U,S,) 60 
329 U.S. 402 
327 U.S. 758 
309 U.S. 83 
296 u.s. 404 
321 U.S. 96 
277 U.S. 151 
6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 231 
6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 253 
320 U.S. 661 
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113 U.S. 476 
7 Wall, (74 U.S.) 700 
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Nye v. United States 1941 
overruiing 28 E 
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United 
States 1918 
Oldahoma Tax Commission v. Texas 
Co. 1949 
overruling 35 E 
Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison 1914 
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil 
Co. v. Oklahoma 1916 
Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co. 1917 
Large Oil Co. v. Howard 1919 
Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Refineries 1936 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United 
States 1943 
overruling 17 E 
Childers v. Beaver 1926 
Olsen v. Nebraska 1941 
overruUng 13 E 
Rlbnilt v. McBride 1928 
O'Malley v. Woodrough 1939 
overruUng 19 E 
Evans v. Gore 1920 
Miles v. Graham 1925 
Ott v. Mississippi Bargellne 1949 
overruUng 78 0 
St. Louis v. Ferry Co. 1870 
Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia 1905 
Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky 1906 
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Towers 1917 
overruling 18 E 
Laite Shore Ry. Co. v. Smith 1899 
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247 U.S. 402 
836 U.S. 843 
285 U.S. 292 
240 U.S. 522 
247 U.S. 503 
248 U.S. 549 
296 U.S. 521 
319 U.S. 598 
270 U.S. 555 
313 U.S. 236 
277 U.S. 350 
307 U.S. 277 
253 U.S. 245 
268 U.S. 501 
336 U.S. 169 
11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 428 
198 U.S. 299 
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Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B. 1941 8-01 Frankfurter -overruling 34 D 
.Adair v. United States 1908 6-2 Harlan (1st) McKenna, Holmes 
Coppage v. Kansas 1915 6-3 Pitney Holmes, Day, Hughes 
Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. 
Pennsylvania 1887 8-0 Bradley -overruling 14 E 
State Tax On Ry. Gross Receipts 1872 6-3 Strong Miller, Field, Hunt 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 1895 5-4 Fuller Harlan, Brown, Jackson, H, E, 
White 
overruling 99 B 
Hylton v. United States 1796 3-0 Chase, S. -
Railroad Commission v. Pacific Gas 
Co. (Rehearing) 1938 6-2 Hughes Butler, McReynolds 
overruling 6mos. 0 
Railroad Commission v. Pacific Gas 
Co. 1937 4-4 Per Curiam (Not Recorded) 
Railway Co. v. McShane 1874 9-0 Miller -overruling 2 E 
Railway Co. v. Prescott 1872 9-0 Miller -
Reid v. Covert (Rehearing) 
Kinsella v. Krueger 1957 6-2 Black Clark, Burton 
overruling 1 0 
Reid v. Covert 1956 5-3 Clark Warren, Black, Douglas 
Kinsella v. Krueger 1956 5-3 Clark Warren, Black, Douglas 
Roberts v. Lewis 1894 9-0 Gray -
overruling 13 E 
Giles v. Little 1881 9-0 Woods -
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States 1939 7-23 Frankfurter Butler, McReynolds 
overmHng 27 0 
Proctor & Gamble v. United States 1912 9-0 White -
Rosen v. United States 1918 7-2 Clarke Van Devanter, McReynolds 
overruling 66 E 
United States v. Reid 1852 9-0 Taney -
1 Unanimous on the point of overruling the prior decisions on the question. 
• The actual decision was unanimous as to result, Justices Butler and McReynolds, however, dissented on the Issue of overruling the prior decision, 
318 U,S, 177 
208 U.S. 161 
236 U.S. 1 
122 U.S. 826 
15 Wall. (82 U.S.) 284 
158 U.S. 601 
3 Dall, (3 U,S.) 171 
302 U.S. 388 
301 U.S. 669 
22 Wall. (89 U.S.) 444 
16 Wall, (83 U.S.) 603 
354 U.S.1 
351 U.S. 487 
351 U.S. 470 
158 U.S. 867 
104 U.S. 291 
307 U.S, 126 
225 U.S. 282 
245 U.S. 467 
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Sherrer v. Sherrer 1948 
overruling 45 E 
Andrews v. Andrews 1903 
Smith v. Allwright 1944 
overruling 9 E 
Grovey v. Townsend 1935 
State Tax Commission v. Aldrich 1942 
overruling 10 E 
First National Bank v. Maine 1982 
Suydam v. Williamson 1861 
overruling 11 0 
Williamson v. Berry 1850 
Williamson v. Irish Presbyterian 
Congregation 1860 
Williamson v. Ball 1850 
Terral v. Burke Construction Co. 1922 
overruling 46 E 
Doyle v. Cont. Ins. Co. 1876 
Security Mutual Life Ins, Co. v. 
Prewitt 1906 
Thibaut v. Car & General Ins. 
Corp. (Rehearing) 1947 
overruling 42days E 
Thibaut v. Car & General Ins. Corp. 1947 
Tigner v. Texas 1940 
overruling 88 E 
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 1902 
Tilghman v. Proctor 1880 
overruling 7 E 
Mitchell v. Tilghman 1878 
Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. 1941 
overruling 20 D 
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble 1921 
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Trebllcock v. Wllson 1871 7-2 Field Bradley, M111er 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 687 
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Roosevelt v. Meyer 1863 9-1 Wayne Nelson 1 Wall. (68 U.S.) 612 
United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. 
&P. R, Co, 1941 9-0 Roberts - 812 U.S. 692 
overruling 88 E 
United States v. Lynah 1903 5-3 Brewer White, Fuller, Harlan (1st) 188 U.S. 445 
United States v. Heyward 1919 4-4 PerCurlam (Not Recorded) 250 U.S. 633 
United States v. Classic 1941 5-3 Stone Douglas, Black, Murphy 313 U.S. 299 
overruling 20 D 
Newberry v. United States 1921 4-4' McReynolds White, Pitney, Brandeis, 
Clarke 256 U.S. 232 
United States v. Darby 1941 9-0 Stone - 312 U.S. 100 
overruling 23 E 
Hammer v. Dagenhart 1918 5-4 Day Holmes, McKenna, Brandeis, 
Clarke 247 U.S. 251 
United States v. Nice 1916 9-0 Van Devanter - 241 U.S. 591 
overruling 11 E 
Matter of Het.e 1905 8-1 Brewer Harlan (1st) 197 U.S. 488 
United States v. Phelps 1882 9-0 Waite - 107 U.S. 320 
overruling 16 El 
Shelton v. The Collector 1866 9-0 Swayne - 5 Wall, (72 U.S.) 113 
United States v. Rabinowitz 1950 5-3 Minton Black, Frankfurter, 
Jackson, R, H. 339 U.S. 56 
overruling 2 El 
Trupiano v. United States 1948 6-4 Murphy Vinson, Black, Reed, Burton 334 U.S. 699 
United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Assn. 1944 4-3 Black Stone, Frankfurter, 
Jackson, R. H. 322 U.S. 533 
overruling 75 D 
Paul v. Virginia 1869 8-0 Field - 8 Wall. (76 U.S.) 168 
Wabash, St, L. & P. Ry, Co. v. Illinois 1886 6-3 Mlller Bradley, Gray, Waite 118 U.S. 557 
overruling 10 D 
Pelk v, Chicago & N. Ry, Co. 1876 7-2 Waite Field, Strong 94 U.S. 164 
'The actual decision was unanimous (9•0) as to result, Justice McKenna reserved Judgment on the constitutional question. The four dissenters dissented on the basis of the constitu-
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West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 1937 
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Adkins v. Children's Hospital 1923 
Morehead v. 'l'Jpaldo 1936 
Wllllams v. North Carolina 1942 
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Zap v. United States 1946 
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